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Rethinking The ASP
Model
You have no doubt noticed the giant ads
IBM has been running, promoting their new e-business on demand
model. “It’s the
next utility,” the ads murmur seductively.
You wouldn’t build your own electrical power plant or
telephone system, would you?
There is a certain logic here.
Being able to buy just-in-time, pay-as-you-go
infrastructure plus implemented applications can be very
appealing, particularly for CIO’s who are looking at the need to
carefully control spending and manage resources.
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It allows them to handle unexpected
demand without the expense of owning rarely used “extra”
resources.
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It offers the opportunity to transform
capital investments in equipment into expense items on the
balance sheet.
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To the extent that their e-business on
demand supplier offers the right mix of applications, they
can get started right away, without the need to go through
planning, design, and implementation cycles that would
ordinarily take at least months and sometimes longer.
This faster road to market can enhance revenue
opportunities, increase customer satisfaction, or provide
other benefits with solid bottom line impact.
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IBM won’t be alone in pursuing this
business model, of course. They’ll
just be coming at it with deep pockets, lots of systems
integration and application implementation experience (from their
Global Services practice), and a solid gold customer list, many of
whom see this new business model as appealing.
(IBM, for example, is currently actively talking to 106
customers.)
We believe it’s best to consider this
move as a rethinking of the ASP business model.
When ASPs first came onto the scene, only a few years ago,
their business model was to resell ISVs software applications on a
monthly rental basis. They
made several mistakes:
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They didn’t understand how important
it was to make the application offering a standard one, with
little or no customization. Many ASPs lost their shirts signing up customers by
promising and providing free customization that ate up all
their future profits. IBM,
for example, limits customization in this model, to simple
preferences, expressed by customers via dialogues.
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Early ASPs emphasized price as a major
differentiator and found themselves embroiled in no-win
price wars that commoditized their offerings and left them
unable to provide differentiating services.
New (and surviving) ASPs know that their value is in
the incremental services they provide – scarce skills and
expertise, convenience, and time savings. Cost savings are
based on centralized infrastructure and support.
Customers wouldn’t implement an ASP solution that
was MORE expensive than an in-house solution, but they
don’t necessarily expect or demand that the benefit be all
in deep price differentials.
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Marketing was an overlooked issue to
many ASPs. They built on a “if we build it, they will come” model.
Unfortunately, they hadn’t considered the problem
of how prospective customers would know to come – or how,
early in a new concept market, they would understand the
business proposition being offered.
High-end service providers like IBM’s e-business on
demand offering build direct marketing, by their own sales
force, right into the model.
They are also prepared to partner with ISVs,
consultants, and others who will guide customers in their
direction or directly make sales.
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Many early customers of ASPs were
personally led through the process of becoming enabled.
This expensive hand-holding – and equally expensive
ongoing support for the predictable administrative changes
required – made ASPs costs skyrocket.
New-style ASPs focus on self-service provisioning and
administrative support, letting customers customize the
system to suit themselves, but making these changes at their
own expense.
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All of this adds up to a smaller number
of bigger, smarter service providers.
Whether we continue to call them ASPs or whether we decide
to call them xSPs or merely SPs doesn’t really matter.
What does matter is that we all understand what’s going
on here:
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The business model we tried in the first
round was wrong. It
didn’t take into account how services needed to be limited
in order to provide consistent services at a consistent
price while providing a profit to ensure that the business
could continue.
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The customers didn’t understand the
advantages of the ASP model because early ASPs kept trying
to convince them it was all about price; it wasn’t.
These on-demand services are all about convenience
and value.
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We have fixed the business model.
xSPs who want to make money can now see what they
need to do. We
hope that they manage to do it.
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The customers have figured out the
concept and seem to like it, not for everything, but for
many applications, especially for applications, which are
important, but NOT about the core competencies or
competitive advantage of the organization.
I suspect, for instance, that the number of companies
that will choose to support Email as an internal application
is going to start to go way down over the next three years.
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xSPs will continue to differentiate
themselves based on their own competencies.
That means an IBM will be all about infrastructure and
reliability while a software ASP might be all about a particular
function or the application of that function to particular
markets.
Web Services will offer both
infrastructure and functional xSPs the opportunity to rethink
their offerings and to partner in new and interesting ways.
That may change the market more profoundly than anything
that has happened so far.
(back to top)
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Entire contents © 2001 by Amy D. Wohl. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication in any form without prior written permission is forbidden.
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